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TEACHING GOOD FAITH* 
CAROLINE N. BROWN** 
I. WHY TEACH GOOD FAITH? 
Teaching good faith to first-year students is a difficult task, but one well 
worth the trouble.  The very reasons that produce the difficulties pay off in a 
rich and diverse set of benefits.  This becomes apparent in the students’ 
demeanor when the discussion of good faith is initiated very early in the year.  
Talking about good faith reinforces their conviction that their new profession is 
indeed an honorable one.  They relax.  The subject feels familiar to them, and 
this sustains them in probing the mysterious new legal dimensions of the 
concept.  As a result, most of the class are emboldened to offer their own ideas, 
and vigorous debate ensues. 
One reason for the excitement is that this discussion so soundly contradicts 
students’ common expectations of what law school will be like.  Although 
most are entranced by the prospect of adventure in unmapped territory, they 
loathe the prospect of memorizing a huge and complex body of “law,” by 
which they mean rules.  Having signed leases, contracts to purchase 
automobiles and checking account agreements, they imagine they know what 
to expect in contracts: lots of words, lots of small print and all of it long, 
formal and tedious.  And following that: memorization.  Each exercise that 
focuses on good faith helps to disabuse them of this notion and to shift their 
focus away from doctrine towards analysis. 
A significant further advantage, as they exchange their anticipated tedium 
for the heady experience of studying law, is that they begin to recognize the 
uselessness of canned-brief-preparation.  Awakened within them is an 
unsettling but titillating suspicion that contract law cannot be reduced to a 
capsule to be swallowed at bedtime.  Law, they begin to learn, is as much 
about understanding context as it is about mastering the rules.  And, as they 
discover, the rules, once mastered, are apt to change! 
The doctrine of good faith has more than one role in tailoring rules to 
context so that the result is consonant not only with precedent, but also with 
good sense and good policy.  Exploring the doctrine in each new context 
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exercises the students’ skills and ingenuity, acquaints them with some basics of 
the business world and contributes to their understanding of human nature.  
Moreover, the discussion pushes students to understand each transaction within 
the moral, normative and economic context of the society in which a court sits. 
That good faith doctrine is a common undercurrent for many disparate 
contracts issues makes its study useful in building students’ skills in 
uncovering common themes in the law.  A principal goal in my first-year 
classes is to teach students how to hypothesize a credible set of exceptions to 
any general rule by carefully attending to the underpinnings of the rule itself.  
Their hypothetical exceptions can then be tested against later cases, statutes 
and Restatement sections.  Over time, the process assures students of their 
dexterity with legal principles, freeing them from the illusion that they must 
learn everything, leaving them more content to devote more class time to 
analysis rather than to doctrine.  This methodology is especially useful to 
illuminate issues in which the public good is perceived to be at war with literal 
fulfillment of private agreement, for example, the pre-existing duty rule or the 
so-called doctrine of economic waste.  Such discussions often implicate good 
faith analysis. 
As the course proceeds, students become aware that the issue of good faith 
appears over and over again, almost as a leitmotif.  Because the meaning, 
derivation and effect of “good faith” vary from one context to another, students 
receive useful practice in generalizing the techniques they learn within each 
discrete legal topic. 
The discussion of good faith draws from the class divergent inferences 
from the facts as well as opinions about them.  I have learned over the years 
that this can produce some difficulties that the instructor ought to try to avoid.  
Students, especially those who have just completed undergraduate school, 
often find the disparity of responses unsettling.  Convinced of their own 
ignorance and inexperience relative (they think) to everyone else’s, some 
respond with dismay, others, with excitement; for a few, hostility and 
determined resistance may follow.  Failing to appreciate that inexperience is a 
universal stage in development, first-year students are liable to measure the 
relative sophistication of their own inferences against their classmates’ and 
despair of their capabilities.  The accompanying sense of personal inadequacy 
can be devastating, especially given the external indicia of success they are 
accustomed to.  This poses a real danger, not only in their academic lives, but 
in their personal ones.  If their discouragement is especially keen, they may opt 
out of hard thinking altogether. 
How the instructor handles the discussion can make a real difference.  One 
helpful step is to be explicit in reminding students even before the first exercise 
that time cures inexperience, and that what is new should be all the more 
exciting for its strangeness.  They need to hear that ignorance is not shameful, 
although the determined maintenance of that condition assuredly is.  Law 
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students are reassured to learn that no one, least of all their clients, will expect 
them to know everything.  I like to remember aloud how much my own clients 
loved to be questioned about what they did and why they did it.  And how they 
loved it when I listened attentively to their answers!  As a favorite teacher of 
my own, Soia Mentschikoff, was fond of saying: “A lawyer is an expert in 
whatever walked through the door last.”  Good faith is valuable for the wide 
array of contexts it provides in which students with very different backgrounds 
may contribute meaningfully. Mercantile problems can be balanced with 
consumer ones,1 commercial transactions with domestic ones.  The variety 
enables the class to combine meaningful experience and insight in probing 
doctrine which underlies much of modern contract law. 
II. TEACHING GOOD FAITH: AN EXPERIENTIAL BASE 
In the first class each year, I challenge my students to an undertaking that 
has a side benefit of building a personal framework for reference for our 
discussions of “good faith.” My principal purpose, however, is that my 
students engage themselves in a relationship which is primarily collegial rather 
than adversarial.  To accomplish this, I begin the first class with only the 
briefest address on the nature of legal study before asking them to introduce 
themselves, including personal as well as academic background.  While their 
attention is still on each other, I ask them to assume personal responsibility to 
support each classmate in his or her success in law school.  Roughly following 
a model often used in MBA programs, I ask that they collaborate in their 
pursuit of their goals in my class, and I encourage them to do the same in other 
classes. 
Incentives to undertake such an obligation may not be readily apparent to 
them.  Understandably, they may suppose that hoarding rather than sharing 
information and understanding will serve them better in the competition for the 
dream job.  I ask them to weigh the long-term relationships they will forge and 
the reputations of generosity, perspicacity and trustworthiness they will gain 
against the immediate and long-term value of a grade.  Additional enduring 
benefits lie in the sense of connection and gratification that comes from 
sharing. 
I doubt very much in any case (and I tell them so) that there are losers 
under the system I propose, even in terms of grade point average.  After all, 
teaching someone else is notoriously the best way to learn; it boosts everyone’s 
sense of mastery without sacrificing anything.  The benefit to those who are 
taught is obvious, but their contribution is no mean one either: sharing one’s 
own confusion is a gift to those who take part in its resolution.  I am persuaded 
that collaboration maximizes the personal advantage of each individual, and I 
 
 1. An added advantage of this strategy is that it reminds students that U.C.C. Article 2 is 
not limited to transactions involving merchants. 
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find my students generally eager to embrace that conviction.  In finishing, I ask 
for their express commitment to the shared endeavor. 
The commitment I ask of my students illustrates powerfully the extent to 
which consensual obligations rest upon the details of a relationship within the 
context of shared purposes.  Their responsibilities to one another do not arise 
from their status as students, or law students, or students in contracts, or even 
in my particular class.2  They are in sharp contrast to the expectations most 
have brought to law school 3 and are voluntarily undertaken.  Students’ shared 
purposes can be fulfilled only if each student’s effort is not merely for his or 
her own sake, but is conscientiously intended to serve a fellow’s need as well.  
Their reciprocal duties derive from common purposes and can be identified 
only by reference to the particularities of my class and its members.  No tally 
of the terms of obligation is made.  Later in the semester, when we discuss 
open quantity contracts, the students’ own experiences will lend depth to their 
appreciation of the reasons why Wood owed a higher duty to Lady Duff-
Gordon than Eastern Airlines owed to Gulf.4 
III. TEACHING GOOD FAITH: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
What follows broadly describes a framework I often use in class to teach 
good faith.  It is designed to carry discussion beyond such definitional 
components as honesty, reasonableness or fairness.  Because good faith is a 
pervasive concept within contract law, it is useful for linking one issue to other 
apparently dissimilar ones, or to demonstrate tensions between a general rule 
and the practical, economic or moral exigencies of a new circumstance.  The 
framework I propose is consequently applied to a host of topics throughout the 
course.  As will become apparent, U.C.C. law is as susceptible to this analysis 
as is common law.  In a two-semester course the same methodology is used for 
second-semester topics as for first. 
My approach to teaching good faith reflects my own perhaps idiosyncratic 
understanding of the concept.  It is certainly no novelty, however, to claim as a 
principal characteristic for good faith its resistance to any universal definition 
or description.5  Definitions and categories are elusive; good faith is not always 
 
 2. Unless the practice has attained customary significance, which I do not believe it has yet. 
 3. This is by anecdotal evidence informally collected. 
 4. Compare U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2000) (ordinary open quantity sales contracts such as 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975)) with U.C.C. § 2-306 
(2) (“exclusive dealing contracts” like Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 
1917) in which the relationship is essentially one of agency). 
 5. For a sampling of the wide variety in good faith literature, see, e.g., JACK BEATSON & 
DANIEL FRIEDMANN, GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW (1995); CHARLES FRIED, 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT (Roger Brownsword et al. eds., 
1999); MICHAEL FURMSTON ET AL., CONTRACT FORMATION AND LETTERS OF INTENT (1998); 
ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW (1997); JOHN C. MCCARTHY, 
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identified by name even when it is most fundamentally and undeniably at 
work.  It is therefore crucial that students learn to approach the issue by teasing 
away obscuring verbiage to reveal the real nature of the obligation or condition 
of good faith.  This task cannot be accomplished without appreciating the full 
context in which the good faith issue arises: historical, political, social, 
economic, relational, moral and ethical, as well as commercial.  I understand 
these contexts not as separate categories, but as factors that may contribute in 
varying degrees to an understanding. 
The methodology below begins with definitional components of good 
faith.  While definitions may vary, especially at common law, those of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) are sufficiently typical to serve as a 
useful reference point, so we begin with these.  Establishing these definitions 
in an early class provides a bridge to other doctrine.  Good faith often serves as 
a foundation to or is interwoven with other doctrine.  Even when good faith is 
not overtly relied upon in a statute or by a court, its presence may be suspected 
when such terms as honesty, reasonableness or fairness are used by courts or in 
statutes. Especially when the rationale for the stated rule is elusive or 
unsatisfying, good faith analysis may provide important clues as to what is 
really going on. 
A. Definitions 
I begin the substantive study of good faith very early in the first semester, 
just after the first case or two and immediately following a discussion of the 
most common sources of contract law.6  In order to allow students to 
concentrate upon statutory language, I draw from a case we have already 
studied for the facts of the problem I give students in class.  The assigned 
preparation is simply to scan the U.C.C. table of contents and to read the 
 
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR BAD FAITH (5th ed. 1990); W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING 
PROMISES (1996); Eric G. Anderson, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of Contracts, 21 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073 (1988); Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The 
Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990); Steven J. Burton, Breach 
of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); 
Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1981); Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith 
Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984); Robert 
A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract 
Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1 (1987); Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 
27 PAC. L.J. 37 (1995); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition 
and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in 
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. 
REV. 195 (1968). 
 6. My course emphasizes the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE for its own sake, as a vehicle 
for statutory interpretation exercise, and as a foil to the common law, which is the dominant 
focus.  The RESTATEMENTS OF CONTRACTS are also introduced at this point. 
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statutes in Article 1 and in Part 1 of Article 2.  I also give a brief summary of 
the history and organization of the U.C.C.  in preparation. 
This initial exercise serves a bundle of goals: (1) inquiring into the nature 
of good faith, particularly its definitional components; (2) introducing the 
scope of Article 27; (3) emphasizing the “purposive” reading required by the 
U.C.C., in contrast to many other statutes which may require more literal 
application; (4) acquainting students with U.C.C. methodology; and (5) 
pressing analysis rather than brute memorization as the principal task in my 
class. 
The U.C.C. § 1-203 obligation and the definitions in Articles 1 and 2 
provide not only a good vehicle to begin statutory construction, but also an 
excellent basis for this first inquiry into good faith.  For one thing, the U.C.C. 
definitions are a good starting point for the more complex study of good faith 
content (both under U.C.C. and common law) that will come later.  For 
another, U.C.C. statutes are peculiarly context-dependent, a feature convenient 
for stressing the contextuality of good faith itself.  The U.C.C. explicitly 
mandates application with an eye to underlying purposes and policies.8  
Moreover, its definitions often are hedged with the caveat “unless the context 
otherwise requires.”  Students begin to reckon with the insufficiency of 
doctrine by itself, even in statutory form, to address even the simplest-
appearing legal problems.  They begin to learn to look for the relative merit of 
solutions, rather than to engage themselves in a quest for the one correct one. 
Unnecessary difficulties are reduced by using a simple and familiar fact 
pattern, such as that in White v. Benkowski.9  The class will already have 
completed the discussion of the damages issues in the case.  Its facts are simple 
and compelling.  The Benkowskis, having agreed to supply water for ten years 
to the Whites via an existing pipeline from their well, maliciously shut off the 
water on several occasions for the purpose of harassing the Whites.10  The 
question for discussion is whether the Benkowskis have breached a statutory 
duty of good faith to the Whites. 
Usually someone promptly suggests that such intentional wrongdoing is a 
breach of the U.C.C. § 1-203 obligation.11  Another student (or I) will point out 
 
 7. See U.C.C. § 2-102.  “Scope; Certain Security and Other Transactions Excluded From 
This Article.  Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in 
goods . . . .”  Id. 
 8. U.C.C. § 1-102(1).  “Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement.  (1) This 
Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.”  Id. 
 9. White v. Benkowski, 155 N.W. 2d 74 (Wis. 1967).  I often assign White as the first case 
in Contracts.  It is found at page 14 of FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, CONTRACTS (5th ed. 1995). 
 10. Id. at 74-75. 
 11. U.C.C. § 1-203.  “Obligation of Good Faith.  Every contract or duty within this Act 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.”  Id. 
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that section 1-203 applies only “within this Act.”12  What “this Act” means 
seems obvious to them at first, and they typically find it disconcerting to 
discover that the drafters bothered to reduce it to statute in section 1-101.13  A 
habit of searching for statutory definitions rather than relying on what they 
suppose “everyone knows” is a hard one to forge, but this is a good place to 
begin. 
The next step, then, is to discover whether the water transaction in White v. 
Benkowski falls within the U.C.C.  After concentrating briefly upon the title of 
Article 2,14 the class focuses upon the scope provision, section 2-102.  This is 
where the analytical fun really begins.  Students are always amazed at the 
number of issues that require analytical skills in this first simple exercise. 
The first mystery is the use of the term “Sales” in Article 2’s title in 
contrast to the different term “transactions” in its scope provision.15  I move 
through this initial dilemma quickly16 in order to focus on the sale/service 
question17 in this water transaction, as well as the issue of moveability posed 
by the definition of goods.18  Brief discussion usually produces a working 
consensus that Article 2 applies, 19 with the caveat that for policy reasons the 
opposite conclusion might be warranted in the case of a governmental provider 
of water.20 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. U.C.C. § 1-101.  “Short Title.  This Act shall be known and may be cited as Uniform 
Commercial Code.” Id. 
 14. U.C.C. § 2-101.  “Short title.  This Article shall be known and may be cited as Uniform 
Commercial Code – Sales.”  Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. This is a good time to mention Article 2A. 
 17. U.C.C. § 2-106(1).  “A ‘sale’ consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer 
for a price (Section 2-401).”  Id.  I direct students to the citation and give them a chance to read it, 
but avoid questions about title in this discussion. 
 18. U.C.C. § 2-105(1).  “‘Goods’ means all things (including specially manufactured goods) 
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in 
which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action.  ‘Goods’ also 
includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to 
realty as described in the section on goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107).”  Id. 
 19. The moveability of water, indicated because it is measurable by meter, is upheld by most 
courts considering the issue (usually for purposes of warranty liability).  See, e.g., Gall v. 
Allegheny County Health Dept., 555 A.2d 786 (Pa. 1989) (sale by local water authority to 
consumers was sale of goods); Zepp v. Mayor & Council of Athens, 348 S.E.2d 673 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1986) (sale of goods where sold by municipality to consumers); Mulberry-Fairplains Water 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of North Wilkesboro, 412 S.E.2d 910 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (town’s sale of 
water to business was sale of goods). 
 20. Cf. Coast Laundry, Inc. v. Lincoln City, 497 P.2d 1224 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) (no U.C.C. 
warranty for water sold by municipality to a laundry). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1384 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1377 
The stage now set, we conclude that U.C.C. § 1-203 probably does impose 
an obligation of good faith on the Benkowskis.  But what, exactly, does such 
an obligation entail?  For this, we must turn to the definitions of good faith. 
A general definition of “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned” is provided in section 1-201(19).  Before examining this definition 
for its content, it is necessary first to inquire whether it is the right definition 
for the Benkowskis’ obligation of good faith.  That requires a search for any 
other definition that would trump Article 1’s general one.  Section 2-103(1)(b), 
21 would seem to govern, this being a sale of goods transaction. 22  But there 
are two problems. 
The first is that U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) states: “In this Article . . . ‘Good 
faith’ in the case of a merchant means . . . .”23  The use of quotation marks 
around good faith indicates that it may apply only to the term “good faith” 
when it appears in an Article 2 statute.  The term we seek to define is in section 
1-203, an Article 1 statute, making section 2-103(1)(b) arguably inapplicable, 
even though the good faith obligation arises within a simple Article 2 sale of 
goods.  On the other hand, underlying purposes and policies are expressly 
cognizable in applying U.C.C. statutes.24  In the absence of any discernible 
policy supporting the restrictive scope that the definition’s punctuation 
suggests, the policy favoring a higher standard of good faith for a merchant 
conducting Article 2 business would seem to carry the day.  But a second 
problem arises from the language of section 2-103(1)(b): the Benkowskis do 
not fit the definition of “merchant” in section 2-104.25  Although their non-
merchant status renders moot the issue of statutory construction posed by the 
quotation marks in section 2-103(1)(b), I choose not to omit it.  The inquiry is 
too valuable, not only for its substance, but for its cautionary effect upon 
students’ tendency to regard statutes as magic seeds yielding certainty-fruit. 
 
 21. U.C.C. § 2-103(1).  “In this Article unless the context otherwise requires . . . (b) ‘Good 
faith’ in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”  Id. 
 22. U.C.C. § 1-201’s definitions defer to those in applicable substantive Articles.  They are 
given “[s]ubject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent Articles of this Act which 
are applicable to specific Articles or parts thereof . . . .”  U.C.C. § 1-201. 
 23. U.C.C. § 2-103. 
 24. Both definitional statutes contain the limiting language, “unless the context otherwise 
requires,”  U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b) and § 1-201 mandate a purposive reading of U.C.C. 
statutes.  See supra note 7. 
 25. U.C.C. § 2-104.  “‘Merchant’ means a person who deals in goods of the kind or 
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the 
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be 
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation 
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.”  Id. § 2-104(1). 
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Now attention can be turned to good faith’s definitional content.  First, the 
definition we have found to apply is “honesty in fact.”26  Does honesty mean 
simply not lying?  Or might it bar intentionally injurious conduct such as the 
Benkowski’s harassment of the Whites?  No clear answer is provided in the 
U.C.C.  The best approximation comes from comparing the subjective 
definition of section 1-201(19) to the mixed subjective/objective definition of 
section 2-103(1)(b).27  Even though itself inapplicable, the Article 2 statute is 
permissibly referred to for its implications in construing a sister statute.  The 
Benkowskis’ conduct in shutting off the water supply for brief periods in order 
to harass the Whites seems neither “reasonable” nor “fair.”  These criteria go 
beyond “honesty” in section 2-103’s merchant provision to supply objective 
terms by which a party’s behavior or motivation may be judged.  The standard 
of reference is not merely the defendant’s own internal one; it incorporates, to 
a large extent, the other party’s apparent expectations and the normative 
standards of the society in which the court sits.  The careful provision in 
section 2-103(1)(b) of the full range of objective criteria (“reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade”) supports the conclusion that 
its “honesty in fact” component, identical to that of section 1-201(19), is meant 
as a wholly subjective test. 
An interesting question is whether the Article 2 definition expands the 
strictures upon a merchant party’s subjective state of mind, or whether the 
reasonableness and fairness it requires pertain solely to external commercial 
standards.  If the former, it could lend some credibility to a more restricted 
reading of section 1-201(19)’s “honesty,” omitting motivational factors that 
implicate normative standards.  Perhaps it requires no more of a non-merchant 
than simply not lying.  Even maliciousness might then pass muster. 
In concluding the discussion, it is important to put the matter back into the 
realm of practicality.  What are the chances for the Whites to prevail in the 
effort to make the Benkowskis pay for their supposed bad faith?  What remedy 
may lie, given the court’s rejection of punitive damages for even a malicious 
breach of contract?  Is a moral victory meaningful?  If the Whites prevail, what 
will they have had to pay and to suffer in order to do so?  Is there any chance 
of settlement? 
B. Distributional Axes for Morphology and Sources 
As the first exercise described immediately above illustrates, the formal 
definitions of good faith provide only a beginning for the inquiry into its 
 
 26. See U.C.C. 2-103(1) and supra note 21. 
 27. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (“‘Good faith’ means honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned.”)  with U.C.C. § 2-103(1) (“In this Article unless the context otherwise 
requires . . . (b) ‘Good faith’ in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance 
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”). 
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meaning and effect.  To further the inquiry and to give substance to the 
definitions, I often focus the discussion by referring to two axes along which 
important applications of good faith may be distributed.  These include: (1) a 
morphologic axis and (2) an axis of sources.28  They are, of course, 
interrelated.29 
Before describing them in detail, I wish to make clear that my purpose in 
using them is more procedural than substantive.  What it is designed to teach is 
an approach to good faith issues; the point of the discussion is not to reach the 
correct conclusion (although we do strive to avoid incorrect ones).  After all, 
the most determined effort to classify cases will fail as evolving commercial, 
political, economic, ethical or normative pressures provide new contexts or 
undermine old ones.  Insofar as inferences rest upon experience, intuition, 
intelligence and wisdom, more than one conclusion may be justified at any one 
time.  Classmates sometimes cannot agree.  This is entirely consistent with my 
goals, as long as their arguments are well-founded.  Disagreement arising from 
competing factual inferences may make students squirm, but the experience 
will enhance their practice of law, making them more willing to admit the 
limitations of their own understanding and more discerning about what 
questions to ask. 
Sometimes students’ conclusions vary because the signals given by the 
courts are ambiguous. Recognizing such ambiguity and learning what to do 
with it is one of a lawyer’s most essential tools; therefore, it ought never be 
eliminated artificially any more than it should be fabricated.  Although I strive 
hard for clarity where it is obtainable, I try to teach my students not to flinch 
from real ambiguity.  As Lewis Thomas observed: 
[L]anguage differs sharply from other biologic systems for communication.  
Ambiguity seems to be an essential, indispensable element for the transfer of 
information from one place to another by words, where matters of real 
importance are concerned.  It is often necessary, for meaning to come through, 
that there be an almost vague sense of strangeness and askewness. Speechless 
animals and cells cannot do this. . . . 
If it were not for the capacity for ambiguity, for the sensing of strangeness, that 
words in all languages provide, we would have no way of recognizing the 
layers of counterpoint in meaning, and we might be spending all our time 
sitting on stone fences, staring into the sun.30 
 
 28. It would be a mistake to make too much of the names I have ascribed to these axes of 
analysis.  I have done so for purposes of this article.  However, I am using metaphor for 
exemplary and illustrative purposes, not as serious descriptive categories. 
 29. The pre-existing duty rule at common-law and under the U.C.C. offers a good 
opportunity to explore the interrelationship between these axes, as the law of nondisclosure and 
misrepresentation. 
 30. LEWIS THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL: NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 111 (1974). 
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Applying a consistent framework throughout the course helps students to 
disentangle the strands of good faith’s sources and components.  The 
familiarity of the framework and the accumulation of observation it fosters 
permit optimal effect from even very brief allusions to it.  As Thomas also 
observed: 
We store up information the way cells store energy.  When we are lucky 
enough to find a direct match between a receptor and a fact, there is a deep 
explosion in the mind; the idea suddenly enlarges, rounds up, bursts with new 
energy, and begins to replicate.  At times, there are chains of reverberating 
explosions, shaking everything: the imagination, as we say, is staggered.31 
Such moments give contracts some of its most delightful moments.32 
1. Morphologic axis 
The first or “morphologic” axis focuses students’ attention upon the 
flexibility afforded the concept of good faith by its resistance to definition.  Its 
essential quality is dynamic; it takes meaning within a wide range, depending 
upon context.  Within the law of contracts, good faith is analogous to stem 
cells within the human body.  That is, not only does it function as a relatively 
undifferentiated set of standards, but it is also capable of highly specialized 
development into discrete rules.  Although this axis may be understood to 
describe the line between good faith standards and rules, I wish to focus not 
upon the dichotomy, but upon the usefulness of the dynamic relationship 
between the two poles.  The concept is constantly evolving in both directions, 
which is illustrated by a simple diagram: 
Undifferentiated good faith----------------------------------------------Discrete rules 
“Undifferentiated” does not mean undefined.  Definitions remain pertinent, 
and this aspect may be assigned independent of definition.  Undifferentiated 
good faith is found in cases where only the results indicate what may be the 
definitional content; it is equally possible to be found, however, when a clear 
definition is given.  The undifferentiated quality lies in the irreduceability of its 
real substance to any formula that can yield predictable results without 
extensive circumstantial details. 
Nor is the undifferentiated form simpler than its opposite, any more than a 
stem cell is simpler than a red blood cell.  One is most useful for its potentiality 
while the other is susceptible of limiting description.  In the undifferentiated 
form, “good faith” is highly contextual; its meaning may be perceived not only 
by means of logic and precedent, but by experience.  Certainly intuition plays a 
part, as does creative intelligence, in providing the raw material making up 
what we call “good faith.”  Of course, not all aspects of the concept are equally 
 
 31. Id. at 108. 
 32. My first awareness of Contracts’ rich potential for such moments I owe to Professor 
Richard Hausler, whose teaching I seek to honor in my own.  He passed away earlier this year. 
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permissible to be raised in court.  Some may be limited in effect or even 
excluded by rules of law such as the parol evidence rule or the rules of 
evidence.  But limiting and exclusionary rules are effective only insofar as 
there is conscious awareness of the nature and source of the information or 
insight in question. 
Even the simplest statutory definition, “honesty in fact,”33 may vary widely 
in application when good faith functions in its undifferentiated form.  An 
example is in the qualification of holders in due course under the original (pre-
1990) version of U.C.C. Article 3.34  The applicable definition of good faith, 
drawn from Article 1, tested only the subjective “honesty”35 of the plaintiff.  
Nevertheless, courts notoriously ignored the limitations of that definition, often 
merging good faith analysis with the objective standards of the notice issue.  
Too suspicious circumstances36 or too close a connection with the payee37 
might disqualify holders from protection.  Although this reduced certainty in 
planning commercial transactions, it produced individual results otherwise 
consistent with good policy, allowing defrauded makers of promissory notes to 
assert their contract defenses38 against those plaintiffs who individually, or as a 
group, lacked commercial justification to demand protection as super-
purchasers.39  In 1990, the drafters of Revised Article 3 finally capitulated, and 
the wholly subjective definition of good faith met its demise for purposes of 
negotiable instruments law.40  It is anticipated that the new definition will 
move good faith under Revised Article 3 at least part way towards a set of 
discrete rules, especially in conjunction with other regulatory protections. 
 
 33. U.C.C. § 2-103. 
 34. Former U.C.C. § 3-302 (1998). 
 35. U.C.C. § 1-201(19). 
 36. See, e.g., General Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 278 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1971) (finding no good 
faith despite the absence of any general duty of a holder to inquire into possible defenses.)  The 
Angelini court found a duty to inquire where “the circumstances of which [the holder] has 
knowledge rise to the level that the failure to inquire reveals a deliberate desire on his part to 
avade knowledge because of a belief or fear that investigation would disclose a defense arising 
from the transaction.”  Id. at 197. 
 37. E.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Wks., 214 P.2d 819 (Cal. 1950). 
 38. Including what Revised Article 3 calls “claims in recoupment.”  See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-
305. 
 39. Many cases explicitly acknowledge that policy considerations underlie their holdings, 
rather than the strictures of statutory definitions. E.g., Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 
A.2d 739 (Del. 1969). “[F]or the reasons of fairness and balance stated in the foregoing 
authorities, Bancredit should be denied the protected status of holder in due course which would 
prevent Mrs. Jones from having her day in court on the defenses she would have otherwise had 
against Dell.”  Id. at 743. 
 40. The revision of U.C.C. Article 3 added a new provision, § 3-103(a)(4), defining “good 
faith” as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”  
U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4).  The definition is strikingly similar to that applicable to merchants under 
Article 2, § 2-103(1)(b). 
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“Good faith” as it applies under U.C.C. Article 541 is in strong contrast to 
Article 3, illustrating that analysis of good faith must not end with a formal 
definition.  As it applies to banks issuing letters of credit, the subjective 
definition of “honesty in fact”42 has functioned as a well-articulated rule of 
law.43  To protect the expectation that letters of credit will be paid solely by 
reference to the paperwork, it is essential that all bank discretion and judgment 
about other matters be eliminated.  Hence, courts hew closely to the strictly 
subjective standard in adjudging the conduct of a bank in deciding whether to 
pay under a credit.  Absence of collusion or other overt dishonesty is all that 
good faith demands of the bank. 
It seems paradoxical that the undifferentiated form of obligation may 
actually foster certainty, at least when its legal effect is independent from the 
obligation’s content.  This is true, for example, when open quantity contracts 
are tested for consideration under U.C.C. § 2-306(1): validation is a foregone 
conclusion.44  Sometimes, as is true for section 2-306(1), the undifferentiated 
nature of the obligation is attributable to a lack of factual commonality among 
the cases within a group.  In that case, time will not transform the 
undifferentiated character.  Sometimes, however, when it stems from 
developmental immaturity (legally, commercially, socially, etc.), an 
undifferentiated form will evolve into a fine set of rules.  Good examples are 
found in conditions of satisfaction and the rules for open price terms under 
U.C.C. § 2-305.  Ill-framed rules, on the other hand, may relapse into the 
undifferentiated form, as the discussion below illustrates. 
At either end of the morphologic axis, there are plenty of cases in which 
good faith operates in conjunction with other law.  It may be interwoven with 
more or less related doctrine, for example, substantial performance or 
economic waste.  Or good faith theory may underlie other doctrine without 
 
 41. See, e.g., Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. River Brand Rice Mills, Inc., 259 F.2d 137 (2d 
Cir. 1958). 
 42. See U.C.C. § 5-102(a)(7) (“‘Good faith’ means honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned”); compare § 1-201(19), which is identical.  The usefulness of providing 
the definition explicitly in Art. 5 rather than implicitly through the general mechanism of Art. 1 is 
that it is more obviously intended that the strictures of the subjective definition be observed by 
courts. 
 43. This is even clearer under Rev. Art. 5 than it was under the initial act for two reasons.  
First, the revision removes the necessity to rely upon the Art. 1 definition by providing it in Art. 5 
itself, § 5-102(7).  Second, the standard of strict compliance of § 5-108 supports the limitations of 
the good faith standard. 
 44. “A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the requirements of 
the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith, except that no 
quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated 
estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or 
demanded.”  U.C.C. § 2-306(1). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1390 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1377 
explicit acknowledgment, as it seems to do for promissory estoppel, for the 
doctrine of mitigation or for impracticability. 
2. Source axis 
The second axis runs from private agreement (assent) at one extreme to 
societal necessity (policy, broadly speaking) at the other.  It can be broadly 
understood as spanning the range of good faith’s sources.  It is most natural to 
associate the parties’ “intentions” with the “assent” pole of this axis.  
Nevertheless, some aspects of “intention,” such as malice, motive and 
opportunism may also invoke strong social policy.  Likewise, despite its 
ordinary placement at the policy end, fairness can be an important, though 
sometimes unstated, qualification for implying intentions.  The objective 
standard of reasonableness may lie close to either end of this axis, or midway 
between, depending upon the degree to which the parties have made their 
expectations explicit. 
The second axis is functional rather than descriptive.  It relates to the role 
good faith plays in mitigating tensions between the policy poles of private 
agreement and societal concerns.  Courts’ attending to the actual and probable 
good faith of the parties help keep the law responsive to the normative and 
moral expectations of the community and of the marketplace.  Appreciation of 
what is generally expected in society in turn contributes to the courts’ 
discernment of parties’ expectations, both real and “constructive,” a function 
important not only to long-term “relational” agreements, but also to one-shot 
transactions where the expectations are expressed in sketchy contract terms or 
where one party’s expectations (for example, a consumer’s) are mostly left to 
the imagination. 
As they arise in discussion, various factors associated with good faith may 
be distributed along this axis in relation to the poles of assent and fairness.  
One might envision such a distribution as this, for example: 
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ASSENT-------------------------------------------------------------------------POLICY 
express terms 
---course of performance 
-------course of dealing 
--------------usage of trade45 
-------------------shared purpose 
--------------------------relationship46 
--------------------------------subject matter of agreement 
--------------------------------------duration of agreement47 






This chart illustrates a very close identification between express terms and 
assent, while ethics and morality are matters of social import.50  The 
relationship of the parties fits midway between: it may implicate both the 
parties’ shared understanding and also a court’s willingness to give it effect as 
a matter of social policy. 
On the second axis, the good faith of the banks issuing letters of credit 
under U.C.C. Article 5 may be understood to derive less from the explicit 
terms of agreement than from policy.  The distinction here is smudged a bit, 
however, because the long-established custom of restricting the bank’s 
obligation to making sure the paper complies with the credit is reflected in the 
terms of agreement with the applicant.  The bank’s lack of discretion about 
whether to pay is part of what makes letters of credit attractive as a payment 
 
 45. But see generally Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s 
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999). 
 46. See, e.g., Deborah Waire Post, The Square Deal Furniture Company, in AMY HILSMAN 
KASTELY, DEBORAH WAIRE POST & SHARON KANG HOM, CONTRACTING LAW 638-39 (1996).  
So-called “relational contract theory,” largely springing from the work of Ian Macneil, is relevant 
to what I mean by “relationship,” but I intend the term in its ordinary sense.  For a recent 
examination of Macneil’s work, see Symposium, Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered 
Questions, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2000). 
 47. See Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 823, 840-46 (2000). 
 48. See KASTELY, POST & HOM, supra note 46, passim. 
 49. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: an Economic 
Rationale for an Inflexible Rule, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 515 (1981). 
 50. The interrelatedness of factors I have elsewhere insisted upon applies here, too.  Assent 
itself is the focus of policies, by which society’s welfare is understood to be served by facilitating 
party autonomy and self-determination. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM 
OF CONTRACT 229-30 (1979). 
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device, especially between strangers in international transactions where the 
vagaries of local law are sought to be avoided by sellers.51  The preservation 
and commercial utility of letters of credit depend upon the banks’ 
invulnerability to persuasion. 
C. Methodology Applied 
Part of the advantage of a consistent methodology is that it fosters 
disciplined observation and study.  It helps students learn that good faith does 
not, as a rule, override the express terms of an agreement.  They eventually 
realize that “fairness” does not generally mean that all parties share equally in 
the advantage of any enterprise.  The illustrations below represent some 
occasions for which I have found the methodology useful. 
It can be used to great advantage for consideration analysis, in explaining 
why courts insist on the peppercorn theory in some cases (merchant’s promises 
at arm’s length52) and in others, place an apparent bargain under a magnifying 
glass.  Good faith provides a common matrix within which apparently 
disparate consideration issues are linked to one another.  Students can see what 
the common law pre-existing duty rule has in common with the rules about 
forbearance to assert invalid claims as consideration or with the courts’ 
treatment of covenants-not-to-compete in at-will contracts.  Their ability to 
generalize from the specific is enhanced, giving them skill to use in new cases. 
A good example is Fiege v. Boehm,53 in which a young woman agreed to 
forego a claim of bastardy in exchange for the payment of certain expenses, 
losses and child support.  Later, blood tests revealed that the defendant could 
not be the father, and he refused further payments.  The facts are intriguing 
enough to generate vigorous debate about how such a case ought to be 
addressed.  It is axiomatic that forbearance to assert a legal claim stands as 
good consideration only in circumstances that give objective assurance of the 
good faith of the promisee.  Ordinary consideration analysis gives way to a 
pointed inquiry into the promisor’s real volition.  Students are at first perplexed 
by the departure from ordinary consideration analysis.  Why, for instance, does 
the court focus upon the promisee’s (the woman’s) state of mind rather than 
the value of the consideration54 to the promisor?  Why does the court subject 
the consideration to rigorous scrutiny, and why has the rule been reduced to 
such picky detail?55 
 
 51. The buyer’s protection is in negotiation for protective documentation, such as third-party 
inspection certificates. 
 52. But see McKinnon v. Benedict, 157 N.W.2d 665 (Wis. 1968). 
 53. 123 A.2d 316 (Md. 1956). 
 54. There is no doubt that escaping bastardy proceedings is a valuable benefit! 
 55. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 76 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 74 (1981). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] TEACHING GOOD FAITH 1393 
It is well understood that the answers lie in the general danger of 
inappropriate demands approximating extortion when promises are made in 
exchange for forbearance to assert invalid claims.  But society’s interest goes 
beyond prevention of actual extortion.  The complex rules applied in cases like 
Fiege may be seen to ensure the good faith of the promisee and the probable 
good faith of others similarly situated.  Was she honest with the young man?  
Does good faith require disclosure that another might be the father, especially 
given the noncommercial, intensely intimate relationship from which this 
promise springs?  Would the young man reasonably have supposed that he was 
the one and only, or should he have suspected otherwise?  It is apparent that, in 
addition to honesty, a duty of fairness must be observed by the promisee in 
such cases. While consideration is the ancient tool by which such requirements 
have long been implemented, good faith doctrine permeates these decisions.  
Acknowledging it explicitly allows greater flexibility in the law.  The 
requirements might be fine-tuned to fit the circumstances: for example, in an 
intimate relationship such as that in Fiege, a higher standard of disclosure 
might be required, in contrast to an arm’s-length commercial transaction.  For 
this reason, good faith might make a better tool in these cases in its 
undifferentiated form, although it has been articulated in terms of discrete 
rules. 
Another advantage of focusing on good faith when the Fiege issue is 
studied is that it enables students to predict where they might expect to find 
similar judicial responses.  For example, they ought to be able to predict with 
some accuracy what they will find when they study the pre-existing duty rule. 
Another consideration issue which profits from good faith analysis is 
found in at-will employees’ covenants-not-to-compete.56  The dilemma courts 
face in such cases is that while the relationship of employment at-will 
underlines the urgency of the employer’s need for the covenant, it also 
undermines the ostensible volition of the employee because of the threat of 
being fired, especially when there is a time gap between beginning 
employment and signing the covenant.  These covenants often flunk the 
ultimate test of meaningful assent, both doctrinally and pragmatically.  If the 
covenant is enforced, the employee loses what is probably the most valuable 
asset in modern life, the ability to work for a living.  The policy end of the 
second axis must predominate in these cases, where commercial necessity 
mandates enforcement despite the absence of real assent.  The employer’s 
good faith stands in lieu of a traditional bargain, fairness of content and context 
substituting by necessity for full volition.  Because enforceability rests more 
fundamentally upon economic necessity than upon the employee’s assent, the 
employer carries the burden to satisfy a stringent test of reasonableness and 
fairness.  The employee’s disadvantage is weighed up against the employer’s 
 
 56. E.g., Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984). 
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objective and subjective57 motivation, its demonstrated need and its lack of 
opportunistic conduct. 
Another consideration issue for which impermissible motivation and 
opportunistic behavior comes to the fore is in the case of the quantity-
determining party’s performance in a requirements or output contract.58  Fear 
of opportunistic behavior often invalidated open quantity contracts in the early 
years at common law.  Throughout the twentieth century, the cases have 
frequently revealed a concern for fairness in a context where courts perceived 
one party to hold all the cards.59  The concern originally was expressed as 
“lack of mutuality of obligation,” which is bilateral contract language for “no 
consideration.”  The term “mutuality of obligation” sounds like a mandate of 
equivalency in the values exchanged, but that is not what it means.60  However, 
in requirements and outputs contracts, it sometimes seems that the early courts 
made that mistake. 
In recent years, having become persuaded of the economic necessity of 
validation, the courts have overcome their suspicion that the open quantity 
term inherently represents a danger of overreaching.  As a result, consideration 
is found by statutory fiat,61 shifting the concern for “fairness” to issues of 
performance and breach.  The question now is whether one party has used the 
contract terms to achieve an advantage fairly understood to have been 
bargained away.  Open quantity contracts range from small farmers’ deals with 
soup companies to airline’s bargains with oil companies.  There being no 
consistent pattern of power or circumstance, answers to performance questions 
can rarely be given without full contextual detail.  Very similar cases can 
produce justifiably different results. 
An undifferentiated obligation of good faith under U.C.C. § 2-306(1) 
provides a clearly affirmative answer to the consideration question without 
further analysis.62  Good faith provides the standards for performance under 
 
 57. Subjectivity often confuses students because, although subjective in content, it must be 
proven by objective evidence which will not be believed by the trier of fact unless it meets a 
measure of credibility, that is, reasonableness. 
 58. See generally Caroline N. Bruckel (this author’s former name), Consideration in 
Exclusive and Nonexclusive Open Quantity Contracts Under the U.C.C.: A Proposal for a New 
System of Validation, 68 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1983). 
 59. Consideration was found in the negative promise of the requirements buyer not to buy 
the contract quantity from another.  Likewise, the outputs seller was held to have sufficiently 
bound itself by promising not to sell to another.  But for “middlemen” or “jobbers,” as for new 
businesses, the higher potential for unfair and opportunistic use of the open quantity term was 
held to prevent their contracts from being enforceable. 
 60. Mutuality of obligation merely means that the promisee must have undertaken something 
real in order to make an enforceable bilateral contract. 
 61. See U.C.C. § 2-306(1). 
 62. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) measures quantity by “such actual output or requirements as may 
occur in good faith, . . .” 
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the statute, which are expressed in both general and specific terms.63  They rest 
upon assent much more than upon societal norms.  When breach is at issue, the 
undifferentiated form of good faith serves as an ideal tool for the complex and 
subtle analysis necessary to extract the details of a party’s obligation from the 
contract’s context and its performance.  Reasonable expectation is the 
touchstone, but the open quantity term leaves the details unfixed. What is fair 
may be used as a shortcut to expectation.  Opportunistic behavior is barred, but 
what is opportunistic is defined by reference to context.  For example, it 
probably would not be in “good faith” for a manufacturer-buyer in a fixed-
price requirements contract to increase orders in a suddenly rising market if the 
goal is to make a new business reselling them in direct competition with the 
seller.  But the same quantity increase in the same market would be 
permissible if the buyer’s purpose is to meet the exigencies of an long-planned 
expansion of its manufacturing business. 
In a different kind of open quantity contract where the relationship of the 
parties is not arms’ length, but more typical of agency, the good faith 
obligation is expressed as “best efforts.”  The classic case, of course, is Wood 
v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,64 which the U.C.C. has taken up and made 
statutory.65  The rule here is highly developed and discrete, deriving in part 
from society’s demands of such relationships. 
Sometimes, though, efforts to make rules out of good faith fail notably.  A 
notorious example is U.C.C. § 2-207.  Although subsection (1) functions 
admirably as a rule-maker,66 reversing the common-law mirror image rule so 
that contracts may be made through an exchange of forms, it has failed 
miserably at term-setting.67  Part of the problem with the statute is that there is 
no consensus within the legal community as to the crucial aspects of good 
faith.  The dilemma is that forms must be given effect, although no one reads 
them.  In the absence of negotiated terms, good faith serves as a useful 
 
 63. The general term is the good faith obligation referred to in the precedent footnote.  The 
statute adds “. . .  except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or 
in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or 
requirements may be tendered or demanded.”  Id.  The latter language is a specific application of 
good faith in a yet largely undifferentiated form, except for the effect of a contract estimate, 
which triggers a specific rule of good faith.  An estimate in the contract is treated under the 
U.C.C. as express agreement rather than mere prediction as at common law. 
 64. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
 65. U.C.C. § 2-306(2). 
 66. “A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is 
sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to 
or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional 
on assent to the additional or different terms.”  U.C.C. § 2-207(1). 
 67. See generally Caroline N. Brown, Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A 
Framework for Making Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L. REV. 893 
(1991). 
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substitute.  The statute seems to me to utilize that concept in the form of a kind 
of blanket assent,68 by which permission is given to the other party to set terms 
within the ambit of reasonable expectation, with limitations precluding unfair 
surprise.  Expectation is, for me, the touchstone of the statute’s function; the 
predominant social policy is for efficiency.  Others, however, emphasize social 
concerns, seeing section 2-207(2) in terms of a quasi-political concern for the 
equal opportunity of the parties to be term-setters.69  My own conviction is that 
a rule-like application of good faith best serves utility without sacrificing 
fairness.70  The courts, however, have abandoned the old rules of formation 
that gave the statute its backbone, and what has resulted has been a free-for-all 
in which an undifferentiated melange of assent and policy have resulted in 
utter chaos. 
While the common-law rules giving control over terms to the offeror 
probably do need a second look when form contracts are used, it seems 
obvious that section 2-207 has failed as a shortcut for that process.  I am 
persuaded that no rule will resolve this dilemma unless and until the policies 
which favor each party’s careful drafting are reconciled with those which 
justify the failure to read the forms. 
Another example of reverse movement from the highly articulated to the 
undifferentiated version of good faith is apparent in the fate of the famous case 
of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores.71  In allowing damages for a promise made 
during failed contract negotiations, the court hangs its hat on the relatively 
well-organized body of rules called “promissory estoppel,” a doctrine which 
may not appear to the novice to have much to do with good faith at all.  But the 
early hoopla over Hoffman has not eventuated in a derivative body of caselaw.  
One good reason may be that it is preferable to cast such holdings in terms of 
the duty to negotiate in good faith, a duty growing in recognition in the United 
States and of established importance elsewhere.72  Such a duty is specific to a 
number of factors, including, for example, the stage at which negotiations have 
arrived, the nature of the parties’ prior relationship, the nature and extent of 
formalized pre-contract commitments between them, the likelihood of harm to 
one and the other’s need to exercise self-interest, the social importance of the 
endeavor or type of endeavor, etc.  Hoffman’s almost-rule seems to have 
developed in reverse direction along the first axis, towards the stem cell end.  
Depending upon the degree of actual agreement in each case, reasons for 
 
 68. The term comes from KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS 370 (1960). 
 69. See Brown, supra note 67, at 913-17. 
 70. See id. at 937-40 & passim. 
 71. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). 
 72. FURMSTON, supra note 5, at 267-315. 
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liability may be more or less heavily attributable to societal norms, ethics and 
morality. 
For many issues in which the reasonableness of a party’s response to the 
other’s conduct is featured, good faith analysis often adds significantly to 
mastery.  Thus, impracticability doctrine is better understood not as a 
mechanical set of rules, but as an effort to maintain a consensual relationship 
along lines reflected by the parties’ agreement and conduct.  When the parties 
find themselves thrust unexpectedly into circumstances for which they have 
made no provision, the problem is to determine whether their relationship 
ought to survive at all, and if so, by what terms.  The answers lie first and 
foremost in the parties’ expectations, which must be understood in the round, 
in order that their pattern may be projected into the new circumstances.  Of 
course, express terms govern here; as usual, good faith doctrine does little or 
nothing to undermine their efficacy.  In most cases that come to litigation, 
however, express terms such as applicable warranties or force majeure clauses 
are lacking.  One difficult task, then, is to decide whether the parties’ silence 
ought to be understood as an intended risk-allocator for the new circumstances, 
signifying that losses are to be left where they fall.  It is here that the 
foreseeability plays a big part, as does the distinction between general 
adversity and a “contingency.” All these factors affect the reasonableness of an 
expectation that the contractual relationship should be maintained in the face of 
the new circumstances. 
Fairness, the other face of good faith doctrine, comes into play as well, in 
the absence of any provision by the parties for their plight.  Because 
commercial contracting is largely to do with hedging against financial losses, 
an expectation that the other, in effect, will stand surety against even a 
substantial loss, which is directly monetary, seems out of keeping with the 
expectations that reasonably arise from a commercial deal.  On the other hand, 
when the financial loss is not direct, but flows from unexpected difficulties in 
performance, the expectation of the other party’s accommodation seems more 
consistent with the essential bargain that was struck initially.  For most cases, 
in which the real difficulty, more or less directly, is financial, the balance may 
be tipped towards excuse when a catastrophic event can be isolated, removing 
the exigency from the bargained-for risks.  Fairness plays its strongest part 
when the court weighs up the extent of loss (“impracticability”) as a factor. 
Distributing this analysis along the two axes proposed herein reveals that 
the movement in the law from “impossibility” to “impracticability” is not just 
verbiage, nor does it represent merely a liberalization of the rigor by which 
agreed terms are enforced.  The movement to “impracticability” represents an 
accommodation of consensual standards to societal ones.  It is probable that the 
better decisions applying impracticability doctrine, even under the U.C.C.’s 
statutory provisions, and even when the courts seem to be applying a relatively 
mechanical “rule,” are actually conducting a good faith analysis.  That they are 
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testing the parties’ relationship for its extendability into uncharted territory can 
be seen easily in the opinions.  It is just as important, although it can be harder, 
to discern the moral, normative, and perhaps most crucially, economic 
substructure. 
Using the model for good faith analysis also helps reveal that, although 
often cast in doctrinal terms that tempt students to memorize them, 
impracticability doctrine actually embraces a form of good faith which lies far 
from discrete rules, at the undifferentiated end of the spectrum.  Its 
components may not be identifiable at all, though strongly and demonstrably 
present, like a good perfume.  Or the terms of analysis may emphasize 
reasonable expectations, clustering about the explicit implications from express 
terms or from the negotiation process.  Still again, the nature of a party’s 
dilemma and the scope and circumstances of its loss may be center stage.  The 
undifferentiated concept of good faith serves the courts well in enabling a just 
response throughout a wide variety of contexts in which no better solution 
seems to be possible in our society. 
In a few cases, however, repeated experience has given rise to 
conventional rules governing impracticability.  This is true for a seller’s 
performance when payment is by letter of credit.  Under U.C.C. § 5-108, 
impracticability does not excuse even an immaterial nonconformance between 
the documents and the terms of credit.73  That this is consonant with the 
parties’ expectations is so long established as to be axiomatic.  The 
inefficiencies that would attend a departure from the rule brook no exception. 
Similarly, a rule concept of good faith is exemplified by U.C.C. § 2-614.  
Not only does it recognize an impracticability excuse, it goes so far as to 
require that a substituted performance be tendered and accepted for a 
particularized set of peripheral contract terms such as berthing or unloading 
facilities.  The mandatory terms of the statute leave a court little or no room for 
inquiring into the details of the parties’ relationship or the terms of their 
agreement.74  In this case, society’s concerns for efficiency easily outweigh 
other interests because the departure from agreed performance is commercially 
insignificant by comparison to the huge loss to the seller were it unable to 
trigger the buyer’s obligation to take the goods and pay. 
Focusing repeatedly on good faith provides opportunities for students to 
draw connections between ostensibly remote points of law.  For example, 
 
 73. “Except as otherwise provided . . . an issuer shall honor a presentation that . . . appears 
on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit . Except as 
otherwise provided . . . and unless otherwise agreed with the applicant, an issuer shall dishonor a 
presentation that does not appear so to comply.”  U.C.C. § 5-108(a). 
 74. The “must” of U.C.C. § 2-614 can be weighed against the general permissibility of 
variance by agreement, found in § 1-102(3) (“. . . but the parties may by agreement determine the 
standards by which the performance of . . . obligations is to be measured if such standards are not 
manifestly unreasonable”). 
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students looking at U.C.C. § 2-614 may remember a similar analysis of the 
seller’s right to cure under section 2-508(2).75  That statute has enabled courts 
to respond aptly to the economic significance of the likely losses if sellers lose 
the right to a price by a defective tender of goods.  It has made a wide swathe 
through the “perfect tender rule.”76  The effect is to allow sellers much greater 
leeway, consistently with reason and fairness, one might say, in correcting 
nonconforming tenders without losing the right to the price.  Courts have 
apparently seen enough similar cases to forge something close to a rule here 
despite the statute’s notoriously ambiguous language (“a nonconforming 
tender which the seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable 
with or without money allowance”77).  In undercutting the common law 
proposition that most sales terms are to be construed as express conditions as 
well as promises, section 2-508 seems to counter the parties’ freedom to 
contract.  But when students are asked whether explicit express conditions are 
governed by section 2-508, they are easily able to demonstrate that the 
reasonableness of the buyer’s response rests in large part upon what risks fairly 
should be understood as allocated to each party.  In the absence of explicit 
language, the statute allows numerous factors to come into play, including the 
seller’s awareness of the defect, the reasons for unawareness or for a conscious 
choice to ship nonconforming goods, the parties’ past conduct, the materiality 
of the breach to the buyer,78 the extent of loss to the seller if the buyer is 
excused from performance.  Probable expectation here seems to weigh about 
as heavily as avoiding the seller’s forfeiture.  Opportunistic behavior and 
motivation of both parties seems relevant. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are many pedagogical advantages to a systematic approach to the 
teaching of good faith.  While I recognize that there are flaws to the 
suggestions above, I do not believe that any other model would be immune to 
that objection.  A particular advantage of the approach I use is its flexibility.  I 
do not suppose it to be the only useful methodology, nor indeed is it the only 
 
 75. “Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had reasonable 
grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance the seller may if he 
seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender.”  
U.C.C. § 2-508(2). 
 76. U.C.C. § 2-601.  “Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment 
contracts . . . and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual limitations of 
remedy . . ., if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, 
the buyer may (a) reject the whole; or (b) accept the whole; or (c) accept any commercial unit or 
units and reject the rest.”  Id. 
 77. U.C.C. § 2-508(2). 
 78. See, e.g., the “shaken faith” doctrine in Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d 195, 
205 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968). 
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one I use myself.  It generally serves my purposes well, though, not only 
because it helps students make sense of each particular day’s assignment, but 
also because it encourages them to place each case, statute or Restatement 
section within a broader framework of doctrine and policy.  It is my hope that 
their efforts in my class to construct such a framework for themselves will 
continue after law school, enabling them to choose their legal tools wisely, to 
apply them confidently and to respond readily and effectively to an adversary’s 
contentions. 
 
